Civil-Political Covenant, regarding "genuine periodic elections," be criticized as severely as the country which violates Article 7, regarding the right not to be tortured? Should the right to work under Article 6 of the Economic-SocialCultural Covenant be as important as the right to eat under Article 11?
Yet it is somewhat specious to continue making the above criticisms of biases in human rights standards in the 1980s; for in the 1970s, the Third World members of the U.N. made a concerted effort to rectify the perceived bias toward political, as against economic, rights. The effort was successful, indeed perhaps too successful, as there is now a general trend to assert that political rights and civil liberties must wait until economic rights have been realized.8 This trend can be seen most clearly in the calls for a New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.) beginning in 1974.9 The most important of the numerous documents agreed upon since 1974 was a 1977 U.N. resolution, "Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms."10 This resolution stated that equal attention ought to be given to civil-political and economic-social-cultural rights.11 It then went on, however, to say that in the U.N. system, priority with regard to human rights ought to be given to questions of national sovereignty 12 and to the realization of the N.I.E.O.13 It further requested the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to accept these priorities, presumably over its other concerns. Thus the U.N. system was deflected from investigating individual human rights in the civil and political sphere: the cynic might perhaps conclude that Third World elites, by refocusing U.N. standard-setting activities onto the realm of international inequalities, had preserved their own opportunities for internal inequalities and denial of political rights.
Some Africans might well counter such a cynical interpretation by pointing out that there is, in their view, another inherent bias in the U.N. human rights ideals, that of stressing individual over group rights. This criticism is both political and cultural. Politically, it is based on the view that over the last five centuries, the most immense, systematic, and brutal violations of human rights in Africa have been those of the international slave trade, colonialism, and apartheid. Insofar as apartheid still exists and insofar as colonialism is perpetuated by allegedly neocolonial economic strategies, then in the African view the onus for rectifying human rights abuses in Africa lies especially on the Western, developed world to compensate for past and present injustices and inequalities. Culturally, the argument is that Africans are not individualists, that they are much more group-or communityoriented than Westerners. Thus, Africans maintain, much of the CivilPolitical Covenant ought not to apply to them. This African criticism of the U.N. ideal is now embodied in the 1981 African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights.14 The addition of peoples' rights, even in the very title of this African Charter, marks it off from all other regional charters of rights, such as the European and American Conventions.15 If the African Charter is taken as the new, relevant ideal to which practice in individual African states must adhere, then the African human rights record will be substantially better than if it is compared with the U.N. ideal.
There have been, for example, some severe ethnic persecutions in independent English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. These include Idi Amin's appalling slaughter of specific ethnic groups such as the Acholi and the Langi 16 and the Kenyan persecution of ethnic Somalis in the 1960s.17 But, overall, the cultural integrity of minority ethnic groups has been subject to far less attack than one might expect of new nation-states, even in cases of secessionism (the Igbo of Nigeria) or irredentism (the Ewe of Ghana 18). This does not mean that such groups have suffered no prejudice or discrimination. The Nigerian civil war began after up to fifty thousand Igbo (Biafrans) were slaughtered in the north in 1966. After the Biafran secessionists were defeated in 1970, the Igbo were rapidly reintegrated into national life; but they still suffer discrimination both from their former enemies and from inhabitants of minority (non-lgbo) areas of eastern Nigeria. Despite these examples of severe ethnic conflict, one rarely finds in Africa deliberate wholesale slaughter of ethnic groups (as, for example, the slaughter of American Indians during the period of colonization of North America), nor does one find concerted attempts to eliminate ethnic languages or religious practices. The emphasis on group rights in the African ideal both reinforces the claims of African nation-states vis-a-vis the Westerndominated world economy and encourages the rights of subnational cultural groups within Africa.
Yet the African Rights Charter, like the U.N. standards, is a political document, emanating from the Organization of African Unity, whose Charter has itself been criticized for being little more than a formulation of rights for heads of state.21 The African Rights Charter's underplaying of individual rights allows for considerable abuse of those rights enshrined in the Civil-Political Covenant. The question arises, therefore, which ideal is one to choose as a basis for one's measurement of human rights guarantees or abuses? Does one choose the "universal" U.N. package or the "specific" African package? If one opts for specificity of rights, then to what are they specific: to continent, to nation-state, to "race" or ethnic-cultural group? Can generalizations about human rights be made outside of specificities of place, time, and "level of development"? Academics cannot limit their analyses of human rights to comparisons with international human rights documents. Insofar as all of these documents are essentially political treaties based on compromise and consensus (and indeed, some skeptics would argue, nation-states' guarantees not to rock each others' respective boats), they are neither in the philosophical nor the sociological sense universally valid documents. Similarly, to criticize African or indeed any other national, regional, or continental human rights practices on the bases of these documents is to beg the question of whether human rights are culturally specific as well as the question of whether poor or newly developing countries may be held to the A common means which Third World nations employ to reply to what they rightly consider to be unfair comparisons with Western nations in the area of human rights is to point out the deficiencies in human rights practices which still exist in Western democracies. Underlying these defensive criticisms is a sense of the biases which still exist in the liberal ideal of human rights, even though the original liberal ideal has been supplemented in the last hundred years by a growing quasisocialist sense of the state's moral burden to provide for basic welfare rights for all its citizens. The Western world still stresses the rights of formal political participation and judicial equality, emerging from the French and American revolutions, over the rights of economic equality emerging from Marxism and the Soviet and Chinese revolutions, as well as over the late twentieth-century concern for new "solidarity" rights such as the right to peace and to a healthy environment. It also stresses, again, individual over group rights.
The differences in human rights philosophies of the Third World and the Western world reflect not only differences in ideologies, but also differences in historical experiences and in present forms of social organization. The Western stress on individual political liberties and rights under the law emerged from the struggle of the capitalist bourgeoisie to assert its independence against the kings and feudal nobilities of early modern Europe.22 The mode of economic organization was individual ownership of land and capital along with private employment of labor alienated from the means of production. By contrast, in most new African states there is either a mixed economy with a procapitalist bent, as in Nigeria; a heavily nationalized statecapitalist economy, as in Zambia; or a protosocialist economy, as in Tanzania.
The demands on these economies are heavy. Rapid decolonization in the 1960s was accompanied by rash promises by the new political elites to grant all of the economic demands which a "revolution of rising expectations" had generated among local populations. The economic expectations of the newly freed masses who were the bases of the new elites' political support combined with the ancient African belief in the moral value of economic redistribution to result in a heavy political stress on the "group right" of economic welfare. Unfortunately, however, the new African governments have neither the economic nor the administrative resources (regardless of political will) to fulfill welfare demands. Basic communication and transportation infrastructures do not exist, nor does a tax base which can support complete social security. Human capital resources are scarce, and the bureaucracy is in its infancy.
What confronts Africa, therefore, is precarious elite rule which can justify itself and maintain itself in power only by fulfilling at least some of the massive demands upon it for economic growth, equitable distribution of wealth, basic welfare servicing, and civil and political freedom; in other words, for the rapid creation of a society which approximates those of the Western world today. But how did the Western world itself achieve its enviable human rights position? If Africa is to achieve what the Western world has achieved, then it must study the methods by which those achievements came about. Perhaps the more realistic comparison to be made, therefore, is that of late twentieth-century Africa with Western Europe at a similar stage of economic and political development. violence to adopt the new "national" languages.23 Religious wars occurred; Catholic and Protestant states were carved out; and extreme religious deviants such as the Moors in Spain and the ubiquitous Jews were either expelled, confined to ghettoes, or murdered. "National" cultures were, in other words, secured by brute force, in the absence of any moral concern for freedom of speech, religion, or political participation. By contrast, African states are faced with the task of forging nations out of often recalcitrant local populations while guaranteeing a host of civil and political freedoms which allow for local criticisms, participation, and defense of subnational "group rights." The international and indigenous expectation, moreover, is that this creation of nationhood should be accomplished literally overnight. To function effectively in the modern international economy, Africa must be organized on the basis of definite geographical boundaries; rules of commerce must apply everywhere within each geographic entity; and both foreign visitors and urban administrators expect to find uniformity of laws, language, and customs wherever they go. The task of nationbuilding might be slightly easier in Africa if the boundaries presently being consolidated had emerged from centuries of indigenous political conflict, as they did in Europe; if, for example, the Ashanti had indeed expanded all over Ghana and into Ivory Coast and Togo; if the Kenyan Somalis were actually resident in Somalia; if the Buganda kingdom had expanded and conquered the small ethnic groups surrounding it; if northern, western, and eastern Nigeria had evolved as three different countries. But in Africa, the ruling elites must forge a sense of nationhood out of artificially imposed geographical boundaries while facing human rights constraints and possibilities of international moral censure which were unknown at the time of the European consolidations.
The second problem which African governments face is that they are obliged to implement, as soon as possible, a whole range of "new" rights which were unknown in Europe until the early twentieth century. In the civil and political realm, they were obliged to grant all of the rights which evolved in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as the right to an independent judiciary and the right to formal political participation.24 But they are also obliged to grant all of the new twentieth-century rights. For example, there is pressure upon them to liberalize a whole host of traditional customs in the direction of individual women's autonomy: 25 The communitarian ideal asserts that African social organization differed, and still differs, from the Western world in three crucial respects. The first is that people do not think of themselves as individuals, nor do they worry about individual rights; rather, personhood is attained by fulfilling one's role in the community, and people are more concerned with group, especially ethnic-cultural, than with individual rights.50 The second respect is that political decisions are made through group consensus, the chief consulting the elders who in turn represent the people; hence the competitive model of party politics is inappropriate and the concept of "loyal opposition" is incomprehensible; all loyal members are part of the group and opponents are by definition not loyal. The final respect in which African social organization differs from the Western is economic: in precolonial and present-day Africa, wealth is automatically redistributed; there is no concept of private property, and the wealthy man is respected only if he shares his good fortune with his kin and coethnics.
It is true that in many of the relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated simple societies of precolonial Africa, both economic and political "rights" were guaranteed, at least at the local level, by communal structures. Obligations to family and kin ensured sharing of resources, however scarce. Land was distributed on the basis of need: even domestic slaves were allocated land to support themselves. Even after a great deal of social change, this pattern of resource distribution and family-based sharing continues in contemporary Africa. Nepotistic corruption and patron-client relations are a form of wealth-sharing; national and local governments' resources are distributed by government or bureaucratic officials along ascriptive kin, ethnic, and language criteria. Wealthier urban migrants remit earnings to their families and invest in self-help projects in rural areas. Redistribution of resources is still a potent social ideal.
Similarly on the civil and political level, many of the nondifferentiated, ethnically homogeneous societies of rural Africa had effective means for guaranteeing what is now known as human rights. In those societies in which centralized state structures had not evolved before European conquest, chiefs were selected by and were accountable to tribal elders; and large, village-level meetings in which free speech was allowed were com- Some African scholars present the communitarian ideal as a model of social relations which is specifically African in content; thus they argue for cultural specificity on a racial or regional basis. In fact, however, the model is not confined to Africa; rather, it represents typical agrarian, precapitalist social relations in nonstate societies. It would be useful, for example, to compare such African societies with preindustrial England. Undoubtedly, in the closed-village societies of premodern Europe, we would also discover that people thought of themselves more as members of their own local groups than as individuals, finding a sense of identity by fulfilling their assigned roles rather than by fulfilling "themselves." A counterpoint to the feeling of belongingness would be hostility to strangers, such as outside traders or Jews, just as it is in African societies with their "Zongos," or strangers' quarters. In the feudal system, the lords took some responsibility for storage of grain and protection from famine, just as the chiefs were responsible for redistributing food and allocating land in precolonial Africa.
I do not wish to stretch the comparison too far: feudal Europe and precolonial Africa are not altogether arialagous. The point, however, is that both were relatively simple social structures. What some writers view as essentially different African and Western social structures and ways of thinking are actually differences between relatively simple and relatively complex societies."7 In simple societies, there is little social stratification, so that it is easy to have consensual decision-making and redistribution of wealth; there are no economic classes competing against each other for scarce resources. Moreover, social roles are undifferentiated; the villager who fulfills his role as husband is also fulfilling his role as farmer and as respected man in the community. But in more complex societies the roles of husband, economic man, and political man are differentiated; and the individual is likely to compartmentalize himself, having different associational ties for each role. Thus in politics he has more than one interest and cannot easily rely on a community leader to express all his interests for him. Finally, in more complex societies, the different functions of authority, such as law, government, rather than merely engage in static description or in post hoc analysis. Comparisons ought to be historical, not merely in a temporal but, more importantly, in a social sense. Social chronology implies comparing societies at similar stages of development. This does not mean that one ought to be an evolutionist, assuming that all societies evolve through exactly the same stages in an orderly, and inevitable, progression. It does mean that one ought to try to compare societies with similar levels of wealth or in similar stages of economic development, taking into account also similarities in the level of national consolidation and institution-building. An historical sense also means that one will be aware that no society is static. The harkening back to precolonial Africa that is typical of a number of Africans commenting on human rights in their own continent implies an essentially ahistorical approach. All societies change. Africa, as a result of five centuries of incorporation into the world economy and one century of colonial conquest and control, has changed more than most. To present a static picture of communal relations which may have existed in some parts of Africa before contact with Europe began, as a model for contemporary human rights in Africa, is to deny history completely.
Historical comparisons must be combined with a sense of social structure. Whether one compares societies at the same or different times, one is comparing social structures. Contentions that human rights beliefs are specific to particular places (the West, Africa) should not be interpreted as evidence of differing racial or geographical philosophies. Rather, they represent the reflection of different social structures in different belief systems. Although parallels between different social entities can never be exact, we can find substantial similarities in human rights beliefs and practices in the simple, nondifferentiated societies of premodern Europe and precolonial Africa. The communal model of social relations, insofar as it actually exists, is not unique to Africa.
In insisting on the necessity of historically and structurally accurate comparisons, however, I do not mean to deny the independent role of ideas and ideals in shaping any society's view of human rights. People can and do act independently of history. Any prediction based on social scientific analysis can fall flat because of how people act, and how people act is often determined by the ideas they hold dear, even when those ideas may seem inappropriate, in a scientific sense, to their time and place. In Africa the independent role of ideas is more obvious than in Europe. Whereas Europe has been an originator of modern ideologies, Africa has been to a large extent a (sometimes unwilling) recipient. African politicians, philosophers, and lawyers have all been influenced by the Christian religion and by liberal political and judicial ideals which the British introduced into their colonies, even when the British practice fell far short of Britain's own ideals. In more recent times, African intellectuals and other members of the elite have been influenced by both the socialist view of human rights and the emerging inter-national consensus on human rights reflected in the various U.N. standards as well as in Africa's own Rights Charter. Ideas, transformed into fact by human actors endowed with free will, can challenge and overcome both structural constraints and historical "inevitability."
Individuals are not, of course, mere agents of history or victims of social structure, nor are they mere implementers of ideas. Individuals are also selfish human beings, who normally act in a rational manner calculated to achieve their own self-interest. In some societies, including many in precolonial Africa, an individual's self-interest is perceived to be best guaranteed by conformity to group norms and by acting in concern with the group. But in contemporary Africa, in rural as well as urban areas, it is increasingly the case that the individual both separates himself from the group and can no longer rely on a particular group leader to represent him in the multiplicity of his relations with the modern economy and the new state structure. He then begins to represent himself in the new competitive economic and political marketplace. Inevitably, a few individuals rise to the top in this new competitive society.
In Africa, as elsewhere, therefore, new elites are forming as hundreds of millions of individuals pursue their own self-interest. There is nothing new or surprising about this; all historical and structural comparisons will lead to the conclusion that in all but the most primitive of societies, social stratification occurs and elites dominate. In the African as in all other contexts, the existence of elites implies the possibility of elite manipulations of human rights in their own interests. Such elites may enunciate a specifically "African" theory of human rights merely as a legitimizing ideology,59 a cover for their own interests. Thus, for example, the denial of a concept of loyal opposition in African cultural history can become an excuse for holding political dissidents in preventive detention.
The use of historical and structural comparisons can assist the analyst in separating what is actually possible from what is merely the ideal in the practice of human rights. This is an important distinction to make, especially in newly independent, poor countries such as English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. But men make history, and elites can control men. Scientific comparisons may be used as explanations, but should never be used as excuses, for human rights abuses. The Nigerian writer Wole Soyinka speaks of "power morality." 60 Power morality is undoubtedly the most enduring enemy of real human rights, in Africa as elsewhere. 
